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In an integrated global economy, specialisation in trade is an increasingly prominent strategy.  
A labour-abundant, resource-rich economy like Indonesia faces stiff competition for labour-
intensive manufactures; meanwhile, rapid growth in demand for resources from China and 
India  exposes  it  to  the  ‘curse’  of  resource  wealth.    This  diminishes  prospects  for  more 
diversified growth based on renewable resources like human capital. Using an international 
panel  data  set  we  explore  the  influence  of  resource  wealth,  foreign  direct  investment,  and 
human capital on the share of skill-intensive products in total exports. FDI and human capital 
increase this share; resource wealth diminishes it.  We use the results to compare Indonesia 
with Thailand and Malaysia.  Indonesia’s reliance on skill-intensive exports would have been 
higher  had  it  achieved  higher  levels  of  FDI  and  skills.    Indonesia’s  performance  in 
accumulating these endowments, and its relative resource abundance, impede diversification 
in production and trade.  Finally, we discuss policy lessons and options.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is an important case study in economic development both by virtue of its size (it is fourth most 
populous  nation)  and  for  the  lessons  it  may  offer  to  others.  One  of  the  world’s  poorest  and  least-
promising  economies  in  the  1950s,  its  record  of  growth  and  structural  transformation  since  the 
establishment  of  the  New  Order  (1966-98)  has  been  impressive.  Fifteen  years  ago,  in  a  stunning 
vindication of the economic gains of the New Order era, Indonesia (along with Southeast Asian neighbors 
Singapore,  Malaysia  and  Thailand),  was  included  in  the  group  of  so-called  high-performing  Asian 
economies (HPAEs) whose growth successes defined the ‘East Asian Miracle’ (World Bank 1993). For the 
half-decade  1993-97,  Indonesia’s  per  capita  income  placed  it  among  the  lower-middle-income 
economies—a position it relinquished during the Asian Crisis, but regained in 2003 (World Bank 2008).  
Despite these gains, however, Indonesia’s recent growth has been persistently slower than that of its 
closest HPAE comparators, Malaysia and Thailand. Taking 1990 as a base, by 2006 Indonesia’s per capita 
income (measured in PPP-adjusted dollars) had grown by 35%; Thailand’s by 44%, and Malaysia’s by 
50% (figure 1). The ratio of Indonesian to Thai per capita income had fallen from over 48% to 44%, and 
the  ratio  to  Malaysia  from  40%  to  35%.  While  Indonesia’s  growth  record  remains  healthy  by  the 
standards of developing economies worldwide, a puzzle remains as to why its performance within the 
dynamic East and Southeast Asian region has lagged.  
What  explains  Indonesia’s  regional  growth  difference?  Is  there  any  evidence  of  a  long-term 
slowdown in its growth rate, either now or in the future? What would it take for Indonesia to reach the 
‘next level’, i.e. upper middle-income status, or at least to consolidate its position in the lower-middle 
income  group?  Obviously,  there  are  very  many  ways  in  which  these  questions  can  be  framed  and 
answered. In this paper we focus only on Indonesia’s growth challenges and opportunities as a trade-
dependent economy, one that has abundant endowments of natural resources and labour and is also a 
participant in the dynamically growing Asian regional trade in manufactures. In particular, we focus on 
the likely interactions of resource abundance and the prospects for growth through participation in the 
booming regional trade in skill-intensive parts and components. What can we learn about Indonesia from 
an examination of international and regional data? What policy lessons can be drawn, for Indonesia or for 
other developing nations? 
In the rest of this paper we first explore the particular growth challenges faced by economies that are 
abundant in labour and natural resources within a global economy that is increasingly integrated, which 
rewards specialisation, and yet is also increasingly dominated by some very large developing-country 
players, notably China. We continue in section 3 with a quantitative international comparison based on a 
broad group of countries, then, in section 4, with a more detailed examination of the Indonesian case 
within the Southeast Asian regional context. Our analysis is intended to shed light on whether a resource-    3 
 
rich economy like Indonesia might really face a ‘middle-income trap,’ and if so, what policy steps may be 
needed to escape it. Section 5 identifies some preliminary policy implications and concludes.  
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE SHORT AND LONG RUN 
Could pursuit of comparative advantage with an ever-larger and more closely integrated global market 
impose  a  barrier  to  the  growth  of  some  developing  economies?  At  first,  the  very  question  seems 
paradoxical; after all, economists believe that by following comparative advantage a small open economy 
gains from specialisation, which is associated with enhanced opportunities for economic growth. This 
view, however, is subject to a number of challenges that seem relevant to the present-day Indonesian 
case.  
The ‘curse’ of natural resource abundance 
A price-taking country with comparative advantage in non-renewable or depletable natural resources 
will optimally exhaust its stocks, as domestic scarcity will not be reflected in prices derived from global 
markets. Weak property rights in natural resources—a standard phenomenon in developing countries—
generates  even  faster  rates  of  depletion.  Moreover,  resource-based  export  growth  may  reduce  the 
prospects for future economic growth and diversification. The claim that natural resource abundance 
contributes  to  low  growth  rates  among  developing  economies  has  been  given  empirical  support  in 
several prominent papers—notably, though not exclusively, by Sachs and Warner (1999, 2001). Several 
explanations  have  been  offered  for  this  apparent  paradox.  First,  the  Dutch  disease  effects  of  natural 
resource exports can inhibit growth in all other tradable sectors due to competition for labour and capital 
from  resource  sectors  and  secondary,  demand-driven  expansion  in  non-traded  sectors  (Corden  and 
Neary 1982). The losers will typically include manufacturing, a sector whose expansion is commonly 
believed to generate positive productivity externalities giving rise to increasing returns. Slower growth in 
manufacturing  then  reduces  the  economy’s  potential  for  dynamic  growth.  Second,  specialisation  in 
natural resource sectors may reduce returns on human capital investments, and thus diminish incentives 
for educational attainment (Gylfason 2001a). Resource-abundant countries in which this occurs will then 
find it more difficult to climb product variety or quality ladders in manufacturing, where human capital 
inputs are employed with increasing intensity on each successive rung. Third, lower growth rates have 
also been attributed to the destabilising macroeconomic consequences of Dutch disease. Resource booms 
cause relative shrinkage in the output of non-resource tradable sectors, while resource and non-tradable 
sectors expand. Consequently, the shares of resources and nontradables in GDP increase, as does the 
share of resources in total trade. This has the effect of increasing vulnerability to global market shocks. In 
world markets, commodity prices fluctuate much more than do the prices of other goods, so both relative 
prices and incomes in the domestic economy become less stable. By the nature of nontradable sectors, 
adjustment to demand or supply shocks also takes place disproportionately through price fluctuations     4 
 
(Hausmann and Rigobon 2002). Thus, both price and income instability and unpredictability of returns 
on investments are magnified in resource-dependent developing economies.  
Such  effects  are  of  course  not  automatic,  but  rather  are  experienced  conditional  on  particular 
configurations  of  policies  and  institutions  (Humphreys,  Sachs  and  Stiglitz  2007).  A  large  literature 
attributes  development  failures  in  resource-abundant  economies  to  institutional  weaknesses,  whether 
these are due to colonial legacies (Acemoglu et al. 2002), ethnic divisions (Easterly and Levine 1997), or 
other causes. Some recent political economy papers argue that resource wealth itself contributes to the 
degradation  of  the  rule  of  law  and  the  institutions  of  governance  and  policy-making,  in  effect  by 
promoting  the  ascendance  of  the  ‘predatory  state’  over  the  ‘developmental  state’—either  by  actively 
encouraging the former through corruption related to resource rents, or by undermining the latter when 
revenue flows associated with resource extraction become the dominant source of income (Auty 2001; 
Murphy et al. 1993). Arguments of this type have been made with particular force in case studies of Latin 
American and sub-Saharan Africa (Acemoglu et al. 2002; 2004). Mauro (1998) has uncovered a statistically 
significant negative relationship between corruption and investment. 
The quality of development policy, including that intended to strengthen governance and the rule of 
law, may also be negatively affected by natural resource wealth. Gylfason (2001a, 2001b) has argued that 
the sudden increase in income that follows a natural resource discovery may reduce the perceived need 
for sound economic management and for institutional quality. The boom may also create a false sense of 
economic security and weaken the perceived need for investment and growth-promoting strategies. In 
resource-abundant  economies,  politically  powerful  interest  groups  use  rents  to  gain  political  and 
economic power, which is usually against the public interest (Mauro 1998, Sachs and Warner 1999, Leite 
and Weidmann 1999, Gylfason 2001b; Torvik 2001). Isham et al. (2003) argue that because revenue from 
resources is unearned income, the diminished need to raise revenue from taxes on earned income means 
that  the  state  in  a  resource-rich  economy  has  less  incentive  to  develop  efficient  and  accountable 
institutions  of  public  finance.  There  is  also  less  incentive  for  citizens  to  demand  mechanisms  of 
accountability  or  to  create  the  horizontal  social  associations  that  many  feel  are  the  preconditions  of 
democracy. With unearned revenues, moreover, the state can mollify dissent through a variety of means 
(buying off critics, patronage, infrastructure projects, outright graft), and also has resources with which to 
pursue  repression  and  violence  against  dissenters.  In  a  recent  econometric  exercise  Atkinson  and 
Hamilton (2003) find that resource abundance has a significant negative effect on economic growth only 
in countries where government revenues from resource rents are directed toward consumption rather 
than investment, leading to low rates of genuine (i.e., resource wealth adjusted) savings. They conclude 
that  institutions  that  are  sufficiently  robust  to  prevent  the  dissipation  of  resource  rents  on  current 
consumption might avert the resource curse.      5 
 
Exogenous changes in comparative advantage 
Indonesia  is  also  a  labour-abundant  economy,  and  in  the  past  has  used  this  feature  to  good  effect, 
building  large  export-oriented  sectors  in  low-skill,  labour-intensive  activities  such  as  garments  and 
footwear. Even within East and SE Asia, however, Indonesia faces intense competition in the markets for 
these products, especially from emerging low-wage producers such as China and Vietnam. Countries 
that  depend  on  exports  of  low-skill  labour-intensive  products  have  been  shown  to  be  directly  and 
negatively  impacted  by  competition  from  China—the  largest  exporter  by  far  in  these  product 
categories—in trade (Eichengreen et al. 2004) and investment (Eichengreen and Tong 2005). Regional 
measures of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), which show the share of each product in a country’s 
exports relative to the share of that product in world exports, indicate the degree to which Indonesia’s 
comparative advantage is shared with its neighbors. Table 1 illustrates this with RCA data for 2000-04.  
Of course, the growth of large developing economies such as China also creates significant market 
opportunities and in the past decade Indonesia, like many other countries, has seen its exports to China 
grow far faster than total exports. However, the composition of those exports reflects complementarities 
between the two countries. Indonesia’s exports to China are overwhelmingly dominated by agriculture, 
fisheries, minerals, timber and other natural resources and semi-processed manufactures based on these; 
labour-intensive manufactures hardly feature (Coxhead 2007).  On the basis of these data one author has 
suggested quite strong prescriptions:  
…  Indonesia,  facing  sharp  competition  in  international  markets  from  other,  rapidly 
industrializing  countries,  notably  China,  can  no  longer  continue  to  rely  on  its  traditional 
sources of comparative advantage, including its large supplies of relatively cheap, but mostly 
low-skilled labour and its natural resources. In fact, in view of the large overlap of China’s and 
Indonesia’s labour-intensive exports … Indonesia is highly vulnerable to China’s strong export 
competitiveness  …  particularly  in  labour-intensive  manufactured  exports.  Indonesia  will 
therefore have to develop a more sustainable source of comparative advantage in order to raise 
the international competitiveness of its manufacturing industries (Thee 2005: 218).  
Fragmentation trade and endogenous growth  
Endogenous growth theory is constructed around the idea that some forms of growth generate increasing 
returns  or  positive  externalities  such  that  the  economy  can  grow  in  sustained  fashion  rather  than 
converging on a steady state in terms of per capita income. These models are typically articulated in the 
single-sector  context  of  aggregate  growth  models.  Several  contributions,  however,  locate  endogenous 
growth in a two-sector or multi-sector context, and some of these provide reminders of the dynamic costs 
of Dutch disease and related ‘resource curse’ phenomena (van Wijnbergen 1984; Matsuyama 1992; Sachs 
and Warner 1999). In these models, the expansion of a resource-intensive sector such as oil or forestry has 
Dutch disease effects that reduce productivity in activities that rely more heavily on capital, skills or     6 
 
technology, and whose expansion is associated with endogenous growth processes such as productivity 
spillovers.  When  those  sectors  contract,  there  is  a  loss  (or  rather,  failure  to  emerge)  of  productivity 
spillovers,  or  learning-by-doing  effects,  or  scale-related  cost  reductions  associated  with  them.  In  van 
Wijnbergen 1984, for example, the level of activity in manufacturing is hypothesised to raise future factor 
productivity through learning by doing effects. A resource boom reduces manufacturing sector output 
through the familiar Dutch disease mechanisms, and this in turn lowers the potential for productivity 
growth in the future. The economy’s capacity for diversification away from resource dependence toward 
higher-productivity activities in more skill-intensive sectors is reduced. This will be important from a 
welfare  point  of  view  when  natural  resources  are  subject  to  increasing  extraction  costs  or  outright 
exhaustion, since the economy’s level of specialisation in natural resource sectors cannot be sustained in 
the long run. The intertemporal effects of Dutch Disease appear in van Wijnbergen’s model in the form of 
‘unlearning  by  not  doing,’  as  it  were,  with  consequences  for  future  rates  of  economic  growth.1 
Institutional weaknesses, although they are not elucidated in the models just cited, can also play a role 
since they reduce the capacity to manage natural resource assets for the long term, to provide public 
goods,  and  to  overcome  coordination  failures  in  the  supply  of  education  and  training.  Thus  weaker 
institutions create a higher premium on good development policies in the present.  
The importance of skill and technology upgrading is most clearly demonstrated in Asia by the rapid 
growth of ‘fragmentation trade.’ When international trade is costly, it is efficient to develop production 
processes that are vertically integrated within the borders of a national economy. Recently, however, the 
lowering of transport costs and policy barriers to international trade has led to explosive growth in semi-
finished manufactures. In the new global economy, components of manufactured products are produced 
in many locations, depending on cost, and assembly of final products takes place elsewhere. To middle-
income  countries,  the  brightest  feature  of  China’s  growth  has  been  the  expansion  of  its  demand  for 
knowledge-intensive  and  skill-intensive  products,  many  of  them  unfinished  goods  (‘parts  and 
components’), which are then assembled into final products in Chinese factories. Countries (including 
Malaysia  and  Thailand)  that  have  discovered  comparative  advantage  niches  within  the  parts  and 
components market are finding their trade accounts flourishing along with the expansion of Chinese 
demand for imported intermediate goods.  
The  usual  reasoning  from  Ricardian  comparative  advantage  indicates  that  global  welfare  is 
enhanced  by  fragmentation.  As  with  conventional  trade  liberalisation,  however,  fragmentation  can 
                                                             
1 This analysis is a precursor to endogenous growth models in which expansion of high-skill industries has positive 
productivity spillovers, which raise returns to skilled labour and induce additional investments in human capital. But 
human capital investments are financed by profits earned from production in lower-skill industries. So faster growth 
in  lower-skill  industries  accelerates  growth  along  with  structural  change  (expansion  of  higher-skill  output); 
conversely, lower world prices for lower-skill manufactures reduce profits, and thus reduce the rate of growth and 
structural change.     7 
 
produce losers as well as gainers. Losses can occur when a country with comparative advantage in an 
integrated  production  process  loses  market  share  to  others  with  specialised  capabilities,  either  in  the 
production of parts and components or in the assembly of the final product (Jones and Kierzkowski 2001; 
Markusen  and  Venables  2007).2 Parts  and  components  production  tends  to  be  intensive  in  skills  and 
technology,  while  assembly  is  labour-intensive;  therefore,  the  countries  most  at  risk  of  losing  from 
growth  of  fragmentation  trade  are  those  endowed  with  intermediate  endowments  of  both  unskilled 
labour and human capital. As parts and components trade expands, a lower-middle income country like 
Indonesia could see its comparative advantage in manufacturing sectors eroded by the growth of trade 
between  specialist  countries  like  Malaysia  (supplying  high-tech  intermediates)  and  China  (providing 
assembly services), causing it to lose investments in the second industry and not to gain them in the first. 
This  speculation  is  supported  by  recent  empirical  studies  showing  that  China’s  expansion  has  had 
beneficial effects on trade and FDI in upper-middle income economies, but has greatly intensified the 
competition for global market share and FDI with less advanced economies (Eichengreen et al. 2004; 
Eichengreen and Tong 2005). 
A middle-income trap? 
To sum up, the developing countries whose long-term growth prospects are most at risk in the current 
global economy are those that compete at the labour-intensive end of their manufacturing spectrum with 
low-income economies; have little or no complementarity with those economies as suppliers of more 
skill-intensive parts and components; and have either a high dependence on imported energy and raw 
materials,  or  have  exhaustible  natural  resource  wealth  but  lack  robust  institutions  to  manage  its 
extraction and the disposition of the associated rents. These economies may be experiencing a variant of 
what the World Bank (2007) has termed the ‘middle income trap’, albeit one with features more specific 
to  lower-middle  income  economies  than  to  those  economies  (mainly  in  Latin  America  and  Eastern 
Europe) aspiring to make the transition from middle to high income. The key challenges, however, are 
generically the same:  
                                                             
2 As Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) put it, ‘an Olympic gold winner in a mixed event, such as the decathlon … might 
return with no medals if the event is broken down into separate components.’     8 
 
History shows that while many countries have been able to make it from low income to middle 
income, relatively few have carried on to high income… A lot of complex challenges have to be 
met, from raising the skills and innovativeness of the labour force, to creating sophisticated 
financial systems, to maintaining social cohesion, to greatly reducing corruption. Without these 
sorts of tough policy and institutional changes, countries stay where they are, unable to bust 
out of middle income. (World Bank 2007) 
The foregoing discussion is a reminder that mere engagement with the global economy is not a 
sufficient condition for sustained economic growth. Natural resource exhaustion, Dutch disease and the 
resource ‘curse’, and the emergence of competitor economies large enough to alter export prices in world 
markets all pose threats to growth strategies based on the pursuit of comparative advantage alone. To 
escape such a trap requires actions and policy decisions that dynamically ‘build’ comparative advantage 
in more skill-intensive (and more highly differentiated) activities. This is a well-trodden development 
path in East Asia, though of course the specific strategies by which changes in comparative advantage 
have been pursued vary widely.3 The same World Bank study describes the challenge in general terms as 
follows: 
 [C]ountries  that  are  successfully  making  a  transition  towards  high  income  status  begin  to 
specialize in selected areas where they are able to achieve economies of scale and technological 
leadership. Accompanying this change are a whole host of complex transitions, for example, 
substantial increases in the proportion of people with tertiary education and specialized skills, 
the transition from economies that largely absorb knowledge from abroad to ones that are also 
a source of innovation, the development of deep financial systems that provide a diverse range 
of services, the movement of much of the population into livable cities, among many others. At 
the socio-political level, successfully transitioning countries are able to maintain a certain level 
of  social  cohesion,  avoiding  the  emergence  of  deep  inequities  of  the  kind  that  fuel  social 
conflict and political instability and stall growth. Clean government and rule of law become the 
norm, while corruption becomes the exception.’ (World Bank 2007: 26) 
This list of conditions is clearly neither complete nor rigorous (for example, it’s hard to imagine that 
urbanisation is anything but an endogenous response to other economic changes), but its characterisation 
of supply-side requirements— skills, capacity to use knowledge in creative ways, and macroeconomic 
stability—are  widely  agreed.  Asia  provides  several  examples  of  countries  that  have  achieved  upper-
middle income status despite high inequality and deep social divisions—Malaysia is one— but none that 
have  succeeded  without  overcoming  these  supply-side  constraints.  While  the  mix  varies  greatly,  the 
combination  of  skilled  domestic  workers  and  new  technologies  (principally  though  not  exclusively 
                                                             
3 Collins and Bosworth (1999) provide an excellent overview of the mid-1990s blossoming of scholarly studies on this 
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supplied through FDI) is common to all East Asian success stories. Motivated by this stylised fact, the 
next section of this paper explores possible relationships between country characteristics and the relative 
importance of net exports of skill-intensive products in total exports.  
SKILL-INTENSIVE EXPORTS: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
Is there any empirically observable relationship between an economy’s endowments of productive factors 
and  natural  resources  and  its  degree  of  specialisation  in  skill-intensive  exports?  There  is  no  obvious 
answer to this question, and as with the empirical growth literature, there is also little clear theoretical 
guidance  beyond  that  presented  in  highly  stylised  models  of  the  kind  referred  to  in  the  previous 
paragraphs. In this section we present an econometric exercise aimed at explaining the skill-intensity of 
exports in a panel of country data.  
The  total  value  of  world  exports  of  high-technology  goods,  according  to  World  Development 
Indicators, is somewhat more than one trillion dollars. In 1999, developing countries accounted for almost 
sixteen per cent of the total, a share that had risen steadily to 22% by 2003, the last year for which such 
data are available. Nearly all the developing country exports come from a small group of countries in 
East/Southeast Asia and Latin America.  
The UN Comtrade database provides usable export data for 103 countries (table 2); from these we 
can construct an unbalanced panel spanning 1980-2005. We are interested in net exports of high-tech 
goods; with the growth of parts and components trade, a country may appear to be a significant exporter 
of skill-intensive goods when in fact it serves merely as an assembly-line for final products whose skill-
intensive inputs are sourced elsewhere. Therefore, in order to interpret the skill-intensity of exports as a 
measure of the skills endowment of an economy, imports of skill-intensive parts and components must 
also be taken into account. We construct a measure of the net skill-intensity of exports as follows. We first 
obtain the value of all exports in the first category shown in table 3 (high skill intensive products). We 
then compute the value of imports of all intermediate goods from the first category, where intermediates 
are defined principally by the use of the terms ‘parts’ or ‘components’ in the product description (the 
exact product codes used are shown below table 3). We then deduct the value of imports from that of 
exports, and divide this value by total merchandise export value to obtain the desired metric. 
Figure 2 shows the resulting data for some of the most prominent skill-intensive developing-country 
exporters. For all countries in this group other than China and Hong Kong, the 1990s-era expansion in the 
export  share  of  high-tech  products  has  not  been  sustained  in  the  new  millennium.  Some  have  seen 
pronounced  falls  in  the  contribution  of  high-tech  products  to  total  exports.  In  other  countries,  like 
Indonesia, net export shares have remained roughly steady since about 2000. In China, meanwhile, the 
net high-tech export share quadrupled between 1999 and 2005, from 9% to 36% of total merchandise 
exports.      10 
 
We hypothesise that the net skill-intensity of exports should be higher in economies with larger 
relative endowments of human capital, and in economies that are hosts to relatively large FDI stocks. The 
role of FDI as a source of innovation and stimulant of skills-based activity in tradables sectors is well 
established in empirical studies (e.g. Hausmann et al. 2007). The level of a country’s FDI stock is also 
likely  to  reflect  macroeconomic  conditions  that  determine  the  general  attractiveness  of  a  country’s 
investment climate (Frankema and Lindblad 2005). For human capital we use the Barro and Lee (2001) 
measure, the percentage of the population aged 25 and over with post-secondary education.4 Since FDI 
can be directed to many sectors, and in the absence of reliable data on the sectoral distribution of FDI by 
country and year, we make the assumption that sectoral FDI stocks in a given country are proportional to 
GDP shares. In the econometric analysis, therefore, we multiply initial FDI stocks in each period by the 
GDP share of manufacturing, in the hope that this adjustment better captures the amount of foreign 
capital going into this part of the economy rather than into property, mining, energy, or services such as 
tourism.5  
Most contributions to the empirical resource curse literature employ the standard aggregate growth 
model, testing hypotheses about the effects of resource wealth on the long-run average growth rate of 
GDP  per  capita  in  linear  regression  models  (e.g.  Sachs  and  Warner  1999;  2001).  Our  variant  on  the 
resource  curse  hypothesis  is  one  step  removed  from  growth  models,  and  rather  than  examining  the 
resource wealth-GDP growth relationship directly, predicts instead that the net skill-intensity of exports 
will be lower, other things equal, in economies with relatively abundant natural resource wealth.  
Finally, we also surmise that the relative strength of institutions may influence the net skill-intensity 
of exports, particularly in resource-rich developing economies, for the reasons given above. We use the 
‘law  and  order’  variable  from  Transparency  International’s  International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG) 
database to proxy for institutional robustness.  
Our options for econometric analysis are tightly constrained by data limitations that restrict us to 
using 5-year sub-periods of the data; with multiple observations on some countries we have a maximum 
of 191 observations, depending on which set of variables are used. Import data required to construct the 
net export measure are unavailable prior to 1985, so we have four usable 5-year periods, from 1985-2000. 
The countries in the data set range from low-income to high-income and span all regions of the world, 
                                                             
4 This measure does not discriminate by type of post-secondary qualification or by quality. We have been unable to 
obtain more detailed data with coverage adequate for a panel of countries.  
5  Obviously  this  adjustment  is  very  crude:  it  ignores  sectoral  capital  intensity,  bundling  of  investments  with 
technology or training, and many other relevant phenomena including the allocation of FDI within manufacturing. 
Some difficulties in constructing cross-country comparisons of FDI are raised in Anderson and Rand (2003). The 
validity of our results using this adjustment method depend on the adjusted figures being correlated with the true 
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meaning that the data set is highly heterogeneous. We attempt to control for the most obvious sources of 
heterogeneity with dummy variables for developing economies, time period, and world region.  
We fit the data to the linear model 
  Yit = a + b′Xit + c′Zit + d′D + eit ,  
where Yit is average net exports of skill-intensive goods as a share of total merchandise exports in country 
i and from year t to t+5, and Xit is a vector of continuous independent variables consisting of adjusted FDI 
stocks, human capital stocks, arable land per capita, oil reserves relative to GDP, and law and order as 
defined by the ICRG. We include the product of oil reserves and the law and order measure to control for 
possible  institutional  interactions  with  oil  wealth,  as  discussed  in  section  2.  The  vector  Zit  contains 
continuous variables intended to control for country-specific characteristics and includes population (a 
proxy for domestic market size), as well as telephone mainlines per capita (Canning and Fay 1993) and 
GDP per capita to capture relative sophistication in the economy not included in the measure of human 
capital. The vector D consists of dummy variables and interactions among them; we include dummies for 
each  five-year  period  except  2000-05,  an  East  Asia  and  Pacific  regional  dummy,  and  another  for 
developing countries. We also use interactions of year and East Asia-Pacific dummies to account for the 
differential growth rate of intra-Asian trade, which has expanded far more quickly than has global trade 
since  1990,  and  in  which  skill-intensive  trade  occupies  an  ever-increasing  share  (Athukorala  and 
Yamashita 2006). Finally, the error term eit is itself a compound that we redefine according to the specific 
panel data estimator used.  
The variables used in the econometric analysis are defined and summarised in table 4, and their 
sources are shown in table 5. Table 6 provides data for some Asian economies.  
Estimation results 
We estimate the model using OLS, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) specifications, and in both 
static and first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) forms.6 To save space, the full set of estimation results is 
                                                             
6 There are in general no unambiguous ex ante reasons to prefer FE or random effects RE estimators, but in the 
current  context,  there  is  a  case  for  using  RE.  The  FE  estimator  uses  only  ‘within’  variation,  i.e.  variation  in  the 
dependent  and  explanatory  variables  after  removing  observation-specific  means.  In  the  case  where much  of  the 
variation in the data is ‘between’, i.e., information contained in the means (across individual observations or time), 
the FE estimator ignores a relatively large share of the information in the data set. Moreover, because FE attenuates 
the variance in the regressors, measurement error imposes a greater degradation in the signal to noise ratio; hence a 
variable measured with error will be more likely to be biased toward zero. On the other hand, RE assumes that the 
independent variables are uncorrelated with the error terms. The FE estimator will be inefficient under the null 
hypothesis that RE is correctly specified, because it discards the information in the group means. If the error terms 
are correlated with the independent variables, then the RE estimator will be inconsistent. Another reason to prefer RE 
is that we want to include some time-invariant dummy variables because we believe these are important sources of     12 
 
available in an online archive.7 In table 6, we report four sets of RE results chosen on ex ante grounds to 
be the most plausible specifications (the criteria applied were relatively complete independent variable 
sets  and  a  mix  of  static  and  AR(1)  specifications).  In  each  regression  model  shown,  the  dependent 
variable is the average value of the net skill-intensity of exports for a given 5-year period. The values of 
the independent variables in vector   are those in the initial year of the same 5-year period.8 
The  results  vary  somewhat  according  to  model  specification,  but  in  most  instances  the  major 
hypotheses  find  statistically  significant  support.9  Larger  relative  endowments  of  adjusted  FDI  are 
strongly  and  significantly  associated  with  higher  shares  of  skill-intensive  exports.  Similarly,  the 
relationship between human capital stocks and skill-intensive exports is robust and positive. The results 
indicate  that  countries  with  richer  endowments  of  skills  and  complementary  resources,  such  as  the 
technologies, market networks and managerial inputs that are typically associated with FDI, perform 
more strongly in the skill-intensity race.  
Natural resource wealth has a negative association with skill-intensity of exports. Larger relative 
endowments of arable land are associated with lower skill-intensity, though not significantly so in the 
two static models. Similarly, oil reserves relative to GDP have a negative and (in 3 out of 4 regressions) 
significant association with the dependent variable. These results are consistent with the Dutch disease 
component  of  the  natural  resource  curse  argument,  that  resource  wealth  undermines  an  economy’s 
capacity to specialise in more skill-intensive products. However, the law and order variable itself, and its 
interaction with oil reserves, is statistically insignificant in all models.  
Among the conditioning variables in vector Z, population and GDP per capita contribute nothing 
significant to the observed variation in skill-intensive export shares. The size of the domestic economy 
seems not to be an important factor once other characteristics have been taken into account. The intensity 
of  telephone  mainlines,  included  in  the  third  and  fourth  estimation  models,  does  carry  explanatory 
power, serving (it seems) as a substitute for the basic differences between developing and high-income 
economies. The coefficient estimates on the developing country dummy lose significance when telephone 
line density is added to the set of independent variables.  
                                                             
explanatory power and as such will help us to get a better prediction for Southeast Asian countries’ net skill-export 
intensity. Accordingly, we use the Hausmann test; for the fully specified static model the null is not rejected, so we 
prefer the more efficient RE estimator. 
7 URL: http://www.aae.wisc.edu/coxhead/papers/coxhead-li-indonesia/resultstables.xls 
8 Empirically, there are two ways to control for an Indonesia-specific effect. We can include a dummy variable for 
Indonesia into all of our regressions; doing so barely changes our estimation or counterfactual analysis results (for 
these results see the URL cited in footnote g). Alternatively, in our counterfactual analysis (section 4 of this paper), 
we take the difference between Indonesia’s actual net skill-intensive export share and our prediction of that share as a 
country-specific effect that varies over time. See subsequent discussion in the text.  
9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggested improvements in the model specification.      13 
 
The East Asia and Pacific dummy is strongly and significantly positive in all models, underlining 
the well-known special characteristics of regional production structure and intra-regional trade.  
Table 8 shows the principal estimates in elasticity form. A ten per cent increase in FDI stocks is 
associated with approximately a 1.8% higher skill-intensive export share.  A 10% greater accumulation of 
skilled  labour  would  raise  the  same  share  by  one  quarter  to  one  third.    Finally,  10%  more  of  either 
measure of natural resource wealth is associated with approximately a 1.5% lower skilled export share.   
These results are suggestive of three distinct policy-relevant stories relating to the expansion of skill-
intensive exports. First, investments in human capital pay dividends in the acquisition of skills-based 
comparative  advantage  for  all  economies.  To  the  extent  that  expected  returns  on  human  capital 
investments  are  subject  to  policy  influences  (for  example,  through  macroeconomic  stability,  or  the 
provision of complementary infrastructure), there is a role for government in helping ensure that private 
investment decisions are sufficient to match the socially optimal growth in demand.  
Second, there is a strong positive association between playing host to tradable-sector FDI and the 
expansion  of  skill-intensive  industries  (Sjöholm  1999;  Blalock  and  Gertler  2004;  Takii  2005).  As  with 
human capital, there are clear policy linkages to the rate of FDI accumulation, and these are likely to 
operate through both macroeconomic policy and microeconomic (sectoral) policies, as well as through the 
design, implementation and enforcement of the regulatory regime.10  
Third, our results thus support a specialised version of the theoretical Dutch disease prediction: after 
controlling for more industry-specific endowments of productive assets, we find that resource-abundant 
countries occupy smaller niches of comparative advantage where skill-intensive products are concerned. 
An  implication  is  that  increased  export  demand  for  agricultural  and  natural  resource  exports  may 
stimulate aggregate economic growth, but this growth will not necessarily lead to the expansion of skills-
based manufacturing output.  
INDONESIA IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT 
In section 2 we identified some sources of apparent vulnerability to a middle-income trap: the resource 
curse and associated loss of capacity in tradable manufacturing sectors; loss of comparative advantage by 
labour-intensive  manufacturing  industries  facing  intensified  global  competition;  and  foregone 
opportunities for growth-enhancing spillovers from skill-intensive industries. Middle-income countries in 
                                                             
10  Several  recent  studies  of  Indonesian  growth  also  identify  important  supply-side  constraints,  including  labour 
market regulations, infrastructural inadequacies, and an unstable legal and political setting (e.g. Athukorala 2006; 
Ramsli  and  Ramstetter  2007).  Such  considerations  undoubtedly  apply  widely  in  the  developing  world.  Our 
econometric analysis can’t capture such effects for a panel of countries without the addition of much more (and more 
detailed)  data.  It  is  likely  that  the  FDI  measure  in  our  data  set  reflects  at  least  part  of  the  effect  of  this  set  of 
constraints, as all must serve to discourage inward FDI flows in manufacturing sectors.  
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Southeast Asia are relatively resource-rich but—thanks to the post-Plaza Accord boom in outward FDI 
from Japan and East Asia and the global FDI boom of the early 1990s—have evolved manufacturing 
sectors that are advanced by the standards of the developing world.  
Among these developing economies, Indonesia has lagged in terms of investments associated with 
productivity growth and progress up the technological ladder (Thee 2005; Frankema and Lindblad 2006). 
Its policies toward FDI have reflected considerable ambivalence. Early New Order era policies offered 
limited  encouragement  to  FDI  in  energy  and  mining,  as  well  as  tariff-jumping  moves  into  import-
substituting manufacturing sectors. Liberalisation of trade and investment policies in the 1980s and early 
1990s was significant but short-lived.  From around 1993 it was subject to both ‘mixed signals’ and the 
onset of ‘deregulation fatigue’ (Azis 1998); in the late New Order era the criteria for investment policy 
reform seemed to be derived at least as much from a domestic political agenda as from the search for 
economic efficiency and growth—at least prior to major reforms adopted in 1994 (Thee 2006). Perhaps as 
a result, Indonesia’s record of total factor productivity growth in the critical early development decades 
1975-95  was  respectable  in  an  absolute  sense,  but  not  relative  to  Asian  trade  partners  and  potential 
competitors (Timmer 1999; Collins and Bosworth 1999).11  
Relatively  low  TFP  growth  can  also  be  understood  in  the  context  of  Indonesia’s  transformation, 
during this period, from an extremely poor, rural and agrarian economy into the ranks of the lower 
middle  income  countries,  a  tremendous  (and  tremendously  rapid)  transformation  based  initially  on 
exploitation of its abundant endowments of natural resources, and increasingly after the mid-1980s, on 
unskilled labour in export-oriented manufacturing. In the post-crisis era, which coincides with the rise of 
China both as a global exporter of many of the same labour-intensive products exported by Indonesia, 
and as a market for skill-intensive inputs to their production, the principal reasons for Indonesia’s low 
performance  in  skills-based  industries  are  different.  These  have  been  identified  and  discussed  in  the 
specific contexts of Indonesian history, politics and economics by Bird and Hill (2006), who offer three 
explanations: a relatively low policy weight applied to skills upgrading relative to the need to reestablish 
macroeconomic stability and an investment-friendly business climate; lack of an adequate educational 
and training infrastructure for the production of skilled workers; and the ‘fundamental discontinuity’ of 
the crisis itself and of the subsequent political upheavals and transition to democracy. To these three 
reasons  we  may  speculatively  add  two  more.  The  first  of  these  is  the  intersectoral  effect  of  global 
commodity  market  booms  that  have  driven  prices  of  some  of  Indonesia’s  key  natural  resource, 
agricultural and horticultural exports to all-time highs (World Bank 2007). While the impact of these 
sustained price shocks has yet to be formally tested, their effects on the real exchange rate, and perhaps 
                                                             
11 ‘Indonesian manufacturing is steadily climbing the technology ladder. However, global levels of TFP have also 
improved  over  the  past  decades.  Hence,  when  viewed  from  an  international  perspective,  Indonesia’s  ascent 
resembles a standstill on the global escalator’ (Timmer 1999: 93).      15 
 
even on domestic factor prices—the two principal channels through which such booms are likely to lower 
profitability in skills-based manufacturing—is likely to have been substantial. Second, it is impossible to 
ignore  the  potential  impact  of  China’s  expansion  on  Indonesia’s  tradable  manufacturing  sectors  in 
general, and on labour-intensive and skill-intensive industries in particular. Competition with China has 
become intense at the labour-intensive end (Coxhead 2007; Eichengreen at al. 2004); whether Indonesia 
has the capacity or cost advantages to exploit complementarities in parts and components trade at the 
skill-intensive end remains in doubt (Thee 2005; Mulapruk and Coxhead 2005; Porter et al. 2006).  
Among the major Asian economies, value-added per worker in Indonesian manufacturing industries 
is not high (figure 3). Indonesia’s labour productivity, by this measure, is lower than in China both in the 
aggregate,  and  in  every  product  division  except  the  major  parts  and  components  category  of  ‘office, 
accounting and computing machinery’. In this category, however, productivity per worker in Indonesia is 
roughly matched by several other lower-middle income economies in the region (Thailand, Philippines 
and India) and is much lower than in neighboring Malaysia. At this level of aggregation at least, there is 
no evidence of a niche market advantage.  
As already seen in figure 2, Indonesia also shares with other middle-income economies a declining 
growth rate of skill-intensive exports in relation to total exports (China is the exception). In the 1990s, 
Indonesia’s exports of goods classified as ‘high-tech’ in the World Development Indicators rose from a 
negligible component of manufacturing exports to a share just above 16%—and most of this was in reality 
the labour-intensive assembly of consumer electronics. Since 2000, moreover, that share has not grown 
(figure 4)—in spite of a near linear rate of expansion in the dollar value of this export category. In fact, as 
the figure shows, the Indonesian data fit very well to a piecewise linear spline function in which the rate 
of expansion of the share of exports classed as high-tech in 2001-05 is only about one-third that of the 
years 1989-2000.12  
These  data  are  complementary  with  direct  (though  subjective)  measures  of  high-tech  capacity 
collected by the Georgia Tech High-Tech Indicators Project (Porter et al. 2006). On measures of socio-
economic and technological infrastructure, national policy orientation, and productive capacity in high-
tech industries, Indonesia is ranked at or near the bottom of the group of 33 nations surveyed. Indonesia 
was  ranked  32/33  in  expert  opinions  of  current  high-tech  production  capacity  (2005)  and  28/33  in 
opinions of future capability. Interestingly, four of the countries ranked below Indonesia in the latter 
assessment are also major resource exporters (Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Russia); the remaining low 
rank was occupied by the Philippines. It is safe to assert from these comparisons that Indonesia is at best 
a marginal player in the global high-tech export market.  
How different would Indonesia’s skill-intensive export record look if its past policies had resulted in 
its attaining human capital and FDI endowments comparable with its regional neighbours? As of 2000, 
                                                             
12 For details of estimation, see URL in footnote 7.     16 
 
only 5% of Indonesians over the age of 25 were recorded as having completed any kind of post-secondary 
education,  compared  with  7.5%  in  Malaysia  and  11.3%  in  Thailand  (table  6).  Indonesia’s  educational 
attainment  figures  are  only  slightly  higher  than  those  for  China  and  Vietnam,  regional  economies 
normally  considered  to  have  progressed  much  less  far  along  the  development  path.  On  FDI,  also, 
Indonesia at best matches most of its regional neighbours. FDI as a percentage of GDP was 2.7% in 2000, 
equivalent to Thailand and the Philippines, but far behind Malaysia and even Vietnam.  
In order to locate the Indonesian experience in regional context we now conduct two counterfactual 
exercises based on the estimates in table 7. Such procedures are of course risky; every country is unique. 
Nonetheless there is value in drawing comparisons, if only for the purpose of sharpening debate over 
what it is that makes each country different, and what might be done, where desired, to alter specific 
country features in ways that could lead to more promising development outcomes.  
As  already  discussed,  the  estimates  reported  in  table  7  are  based  on  a  heterogeneous  group  of 
countries, and our regressions explain only about 63% of the observed variation in that data set. There is 
no  especially  strong  reason  to  expect  that  the  model  will  yield  a  good  prediction  of  the  dependent 
variable for any given country in the data set. It is instructive, therefore, to consider the data in table 9. 
For each country and five-year time period, the first column in this table shows the value of the net skill-
intensive  export  share  in  total  merchandise  exports.  For  Indonesia,  for  example,  gross  skill-intensive 
exports were worth slightly less than corresponding imports in 1986-90; thereafter, the domestic industry 
expanded to the point where, by 2000-05, it accounted in net terms for 13% of merchandise exports. This 
was a huge expansion, particularly given rapid growth in Indonesia’s total exports by value over the 
same period, but is still a figure very much lower than in the two most directly comparable Southeast 
Asian countries, data for which are also shown in the table.  
The  second  column  in  the  table  shows  country-specific  predictions  of  the  dependent  variable, 
obtained by fitting country FDI and human capital data to the coefficient estimates in table 7 and then 
averaging the results over the four models. For Malaysia and Thailand, these average predictions fit the 
actual  data  surprisingly  well,  considering  the  heterogeneity  of  the  underlying  data  from  which  the 
coefficient estimates were obtained. The model underpredicts Malaysia’s skill-intensive export share until 
1995, matches it almost exactly in the late 1990s, then overpredicts in the post-crisis years after 2000. For 
Thailand, the model likewise matches actual export data until 1995, but overpredicts in the post-crisis era. 
For Indonesia, the model consistently overpredicts skilled exports by a very large margin, even after 
controlling for differences in GDP per capita and natural resource wealth and allowing for geographical 
location  in  the  dynamic  Asia-Pacific  grouping.  Based  on  our  panel  data  estimates,  Indonesia’s  skill-
intensive export share by the mid-1990s should have been about 25%: three times the observed share in 
1995-2000, and twice the observed share in 2000-05. Put another way, the model predicts that in 2000-05, 
Indonesia should have had a skill-intensive export share roughly comparable to that enjoyed by Malaysia     17 
 
in 1985-90, or Thailand in 1995-2000. Its actual share, however, corresponds instead to that of Thailand in 
1985-90, and is half that of Malaysia in 1985-90.  
These comparisons are based on within-country predictions from the econometric model, but they 
also suggest an alternative approach. What if Indonesia, due to different policies and conditions in earlier 
years, had achieved levels of FDI and human capital corresponding more closely to those of its regional 
neighbors?  Table  10  provides  indicative  answers  by  generating  predicted  values  of  Indonesia’s  skill-
intensive export share using Indonesian data for all but FDI and human capital, values of which are then 
supplied from the neighboring countries. Suppose, for example, that Indonesia in 1985-90 had Thailand’s 
levels of FDI and human capital; how different would its skill-intensive export share have been? From 
our computations, the answer for this period is ‘not much’: net skill-intensive exports were very low in 
both countries (and negative in Indonesia) during this period. But by the final decade of the data, the 
difference between Thai and Indonesian performance is revealed in an predicted gap of 23%–29%; by 
2000–05, if Indonesia had Thai levels of FDI and human capital, its skill-intensive export share would 
have been four percentage points higher (a 29% difference). This counterfactual is consistent with data on 
the  structure  of  industrial  production  and  trade,  factor  productivity,  R&D  expenditures,  and  the 
technology  content  of  FDI  that  suggest  that  Indonesia  ‘lags  behind  Thailand  by  about  ten  years,  or 
slightly more’ (Frankema and Lindblad 2006).  
Malaysia provides a more stark contrast. Malaysian levels of FDI and human capital investments, if 
replicated in Indonesia, could have helped that country increase the contribution of its skill-intensive 
exports to total merchandise exports by half to two-thirds. If Indonesia had Malaysian levels of FDI and 
human  capital  in  2000–05,  the  counterfactual  indicates  that  skill-intensive  manufactures  would  have 
accounted for 22% of exports rather than the 13% actually recorded.  
Table 10 also shows a breakdown of the contributions of human capital and FDI differences to the 
total difference in each comparison. This reveals that Thailand and Malaysia each differ from Indonesia in 
specific ways. In Malaysia, most of the difference comes from FDI; in Thailand, it comes mainly from 
human capital, at least until 2000. This suggests that although improvements in both FDI and human 
capital accumulation are necessary, there is likely to be more than one path leading to the growth of a 
more skill-intensive manufacturing sector. 
The foregoing are static predictions obtained simply by replacing the Indonesian values of FDI and 
human capital by those from the other two countries within any given period of the data. As such, they 
ignore  the  dynamic  effects  of  investment  decisions  on  the  skill-intensity  export  share  in  subsequent 
periods.  Yet  growth  dynamics  derived  from  learning  by  doing  and  other  phenomena  with  inherent 
intertemporal spillovers are at the heart of the models by van Wijnbergen and others discussed in section 
2.  In  those  models,  growth  can  be  halted  by  a  resource  boom  that  undercuts  profitability  in 
manufacturing  sectors;  the  goal  of  long-run  welfare  maximisation  motivates  interventions  aimed  at 
maintaining manufacturing sector profitability for the duration of the boom. The analog, in our analysis,     18 
 
is that the goal of sustaining and increasing output in skill-intensive sectors, as a means to avoid the 
middle-income  trap,  creates  a  mandate  for  interventions  that  promote  FDI  and  human  capital 
accumulation.  
To  reiterate,  the  comparisons  presented  in  this  section  are  ceteris  paribus  exercises  based  on 
parameter estimates from international panel data. It would be erroneous to dwell too much on the exact 
numbers generated by these counterfactuals. Their real value lies in the questions they inspire. What does 
Indonesia’s relative underperformance in this area imply for recent, current and future growth? What 
policies should have been, or should now be adopted to help ensure sustained economic growth? More 
ambitiously, what challenges does Indonesia’s apparent standstill on the regional escalator (to paraphrase 
Timmer 1999) of technology and productivity growth pose for its ambitions to climb out from lower-
middle  income  status  to  a  level  of  living  at  which  poverty  alleviation  and  other  fundamental 
development challenges are no longer the paramount development policy concerns?  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Lessons of the past 
Indonesia, in 1970–96, was one of only a few resource-rich developing economies clearly to escape the 
‘curse’ of natural resource wealth, because part of the oil revenue windfall was used for productivity-
enhancing  investments  in  other  tradable  sectors,  notably  agriculture  and  manufacturing  (Pinto  1987; 
Coxhead 2007). Part of this achievement may have been merely good fortune due to exogenous events, 
for example the post-Plaza Accord outflow of FDI from Japan and North Asia, and the search by East 
Asian garment and textile producers for production bases with unfulfilled MFA export quotas (Hill 1991). 
But equally clearly, part of the growth boom was due to timely policy reforms during and after the oil 
boom years. Current development policy, both in Indonesia and elsewhere in the developing world, can 
still derive lessons from that experience—especially in the current energy and resource price surge.  
Given  this  experience,  it  seems  ironic  that  Indonesia  now  faces  the  possibility  of  a  long-run 
downturn in growth, based on diminished prospects for labour-intensive manufacturing exports (Takii 
and  Ramstetter  2007),  lack  of  progress  in  skill-intensive  relative  to  total  exports,  and  the  perils  of 
excessive  concentration  on  natural  resource  sectors.  As  in  earlier  years,  the  reasons  for  a  possible 
downturn once again derive from a mix of external and domestic factors. For manufacturing sectors, 
external factors now include competition from China and other labour-abundant low-income countries, 
plus the macroeconomic and trade policy decisions of large economies like the US and the EU. But as in 
the earlier oil boom era, Indonesia can and should now be acting now to ensure that its capacity for 
manufacturing  sector  growth  is  not  diminished  by  Dutch  disease.  Given  the  country’s  continuing 
abundance of low-skill labour, this certainly applies to labour-intensive manufacturing sectors such as 
garments  and  footwear.  But  to  ensure  the  maximum  gains,  it  is  vital  that  policy  also  facilitate  and 
accelerate  the  transformation  of  industry  from  its  current  low  skill-intensity  to  a  higher  and  more     19 
 
dynamic configuration (Thee 2005). Though Indonesia is currently a marginal player in global high-tech 
markets  (Porter  et  al.  2006),  these  markets  are  expanding  very  rapidly.  There  is  scope  to  develop 
comparative advantage in niche markets in this area, if steps are taken to ensure that the economic and 
institutional conditions for productive investments are in place.  
One very important reason to intervene in favour of a more skills-intensive pattern of growth has to 
do  with  dimming  prospects  for  future  natural  resource-based  growth.  The  resource  curse  literature 
dwells exclusively on the consequences of natural resource abundance for long-term economic growth, 
and this is the theme we have pursued also in this paper. In the Indonesian case, however, the long-term 
survival of key resource-based industries is also in serious doubt. The country’s oil and gas reserves are 
nearing exhaustion, and its old-growth forests and fisheries are being rapidly depleted (Resosudarmo 
2005). According to the World Development Indicators, Indonesia’s ‘genuine’ savings rate, taking account 
of these and related environmental trends as well as net additions to the stock of human capital, is far 
below its measured savings rate based on the conventional System of National Accounts. Slower growth 
due to reliance on natural resources—the primary concern of the resource curse literature—is one issue; 
the prospect of structural discontinuities based on the exhaustion of resource stocks and the industries 
they support is quite another, and must soon be confronted in Indonesia. A shift toward production 
based on renewable resources, most prominently human capital, is not merely desirable for long-run 
growth; it is also necessary.  
Implications for development policy 
After the sustained growth and structural transformation of the New Order era, Indonesia is once again 
at a development policy crossroads. The development challenges facing the country at present are similar 
to those of the late 1960s-1980s in that big interventions are required to provide critical public goods 
(institutions  and  infrastructure)  and  to  overcome  coordination  failures  (education,  skills  acquisition, 
health care). But the specific challenges are of course different, as should be expected not only from 
altered  domestic  and  international  conditions,  but  also  from  the  qualitative  differences  between  the 
prerequisites for the transition from low-income to lower-middle-income economy, and those for the 
subsequent transition to upper-middle income or beyond.  
Indonesia’s  middle-income  regional  neighbours,  while  themselves  hardly  paragons  of  good 
governance or policy, have nonetheless managed to achieve and sustain faster transitions away from 
resource dependence and toward skills and technology-intensive production. They have achieved this 
while  facing  more  or  less  the  same  international  conditions  confronted  by  Indonesia.  Though  each 
country’s  story  is  unique,  key  differences  with  Indonesia  appear  to  be  sustained  higher  rates  of 
investment  in  education,  more  open  and  stable  FDI  policies,  and  a  more  favourable  policy  and 
institutional  setting  (Frankema  and  Lindblad  2006).  Indonesia’s  transformation  may  also  have  been     20 
 
hampered, especially in the past half-decade, by a higher level of vulnerability to the structural effects of 
high energy and resource prices.  
Just as rural development programs funded by oil revenues reduced chronic poverty and hastened 
Indonesia’s earlier transformation to middle-income status, it is now time to direct the proceeds from the 
current resource export boom toward an industrial transformation that accelerates diversification away 
from  natural  resource  and  labour-intensive  industries.  This  can  be  achieved,  up  to  a  point  at  least, 
without the risk of ‘picking winners,’ by investing in generalised rather than specialised capacity: human 
capital,  R&D  and  entrepreneurial  capacity,  and  a  policy  and  institutional  environment  in  which  the 
country  is  viewed  as  a  more  favourable  host  for  manufacturing  sector  FDI.  Inconsistencies  and 
unpredictability  in  policies  on  FDI  (Takii  and  Ramstetter  2007;  Manning  and  Roesad  2006)  must  be 
reduced, and complementary policies supporting the expansion of the skilled labour force are urgently 
needed. A firm and sustained commitment to policy innovations in these areas improves the odds that 
Indonesia can take advantage of the rapid growth and integration of Asian parts and components trade, 
the  dynamism  of  neighbouring  economies,  and  the  internal  productivity  dynamics  of  skills-based 
industries to reduce dependence on exhaustible natural resource and low-skilled labour, lift itself out of 
the lowest rank of high-tech exporters, and establish skills-based industries as leading contributors to its 
future economic growth.      21 
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Code  Indonesia  China  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Vietnam 
Travel goods, 
handbags etc  83  0.87  5.12  0.06  2.48  2.00  4.33 
Clothing and 
accessories  84  2.28  4.12  0.68  2.15  1.61  3.88 
Footwear  85  3.02  4.59  0.13  0.24  1.51  13.42 
Note: RCA values greater than 1 indicate comparative advantage. 
Source: Coxhead (2007).      25 
 
Table 2: Countries in the data set 
Region  Countries  Region  Countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Benin  Mauritius  South Asia  Bangladesh  Pakistan 
  Botswana  Mozambique    India  Sri Lanka 
  Cameroon  Niger    Nepal   
  C. Af. Rep.  Senegal       
  Congo  South Africa  ME & N Africa  Algeria  Jordan 
  Ethiopia  Sudan    Bahrain  Kuwait 
  Gambia  Swaziland    Cyprus  Malta 
  Ghana  Togo    Egypt  Syria 
  Kenya  Uganda    Iran  Tunisia 
  Lesotho  Zambia    Israel  Yemen 
  Malawi  Zimbabwe       
  Mali    Other Indust-  Australia  Italy 
      rialized Econs  Austria  Netherlands 
Lat. Am. & Carib.  Argentina  Guyana    Belgium  New Zealand 
  Barbados  Honduras    Canada  Norway 
  Bolivia  Jamaica    Denmark  Portugal 
  Brazil  Mexico    Finland  Spain 
  Chile  Nicaragua    France  Sweden 
  Colombia  Panama    Germany  Switzerland 
  Costa Rica  Paraguay    Greece  Turkey 
  Cuba  Peru    Iceland  UK 
  Dom. Rep.  Trin. & Tob.    Ireland  United States 
  Ecuador  Uruguay       
  El Salvador  Venezuela  E.Europe &  Russia  Lithuania 
  Guatemala    Former USSR  Bulgaria  Poland 
        Croatia  Romania 
E. Asia & Pacific  China  Malaysia    Czech Rep.  Slovakia 
  Fiji  PNG    Hungary   
  Hong Kong  Philippines       
  Indonesia  Singapore       
  Japan  Thailand       
  Korea  Vietnam       
     26 
 
Table 3: Products used in calculating skill-intensity of exports 
Product by Skill Intensity  SITC code 
Aircraft and spacecraft   95 
Pharmaceuticals   54 
Office, accounting and computing machinery   75, 87,88 
Radio, TV and communications equipment   76,77 
High  
Medical, precision and optical instruments   87,88 
      
Other electrical machinery and apparatus   81 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers   71 
Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals   51,52,53,55--59 
Railroad equipment and other transport equip.   78,79 
Medium-
High 
Other machinery and equipment   72,73,74 
     
Coke, refined petroleum product and nuclear fuel   23, 32--35 
Rubber and plastics products   23, 62 
Other non-metallic mineral products  28 
Building and repairing of ships and boats    
Medium-
Low 
Basic metals   67, 68 
  Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery   66, 69, 96, 97 
     
Other manufacturing and recycling  82, 89 
Wood, pulp, paper and printed products   24, 25, 63, 64, 
Food products, beverages and tobacco   00--12, 22, 29, 41, 42 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear   21, 26, 61, 65, 83, 84, 85 
Low  
     
 
Notes:  
1. Total merchandise export value is sum of a country's total merchandise exports to the rest of the world, 
using SITC codes from 00—97.  
 
2. Intermediate goods from the first category: 
HS-1992 codes: 8503, 850490, 850690, 850790, 850870, 850990, 851090, 851190, 851290, 851390, 851490, 
851590, 851690, 851770, 851890, 8522, 8529, 853190, 853290, 853390, 8538, 853990, 854091, 854190, 854390, 
8803, 880400, 9002, 900390, 900590, 900691, 900699, 900791,900792, 900890, 901090, 901190, 901290, 901390, 
901490, 901590, 901790, 901811, 901819, 901819, 901820, 901831, 901890, 902290, 902490, 902590, 902690, 
902790, 902890, 902990, 903090, 903190, 903290, 903300, 911190, 9114, 9209, 9305, 930690, 930700.     27 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of continuous variables 
Variable  Unit  Mean 
Std. 
Dev  Min  Max  Obs 
Count-
ries  Ave. obs 
Net skill intensity of 
exports 
share of exports  0.09  0.15  -0.35  0.63  269  103  2.61 
FDI stock  share of GDP  0.03  0.06  -0.01  0.93  380  101  3.82 
Arable land  ha/person  0.30  0.38  0.00  3.00  401  105  3.82 
Oil reserves  share of GDP  1.54  3.96  0.00  28.84  241  90  2.68 
Post-secondary 
education 
share of pop’n  0.10  0.09  0.00  0.53  397  105  3.78 
Law and order 
Low=0, 
high= 6 
3.90  1.56  0.00  6.00  322  97  3.32 
Population  billion  0.05  0.16  0.00  1.26  406  106  3.83 
Telephone mainlines  # per 100 person  16  19  0.02  76  526  106  4.96 
GDP per capita  year 2000 dollars  7793  9481  111  37165  393  104  3.78 
Note: Oil reserves data are not available for all countries and years. Missing values were computed as 
follows:  
1) Obtain oil reserves data from World Resource Institute, oil export data from UN Comtrade. 
2) Regress of oil reserves data on oil exports by country and year.  
3) Generate missing oil reserves data by prediction based on oil exports, where oil exports are calculated 
from category 2709 of HS1992 (Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude).  






Table 5: Data sources 
Variable  Source 
FDI inflow  World Development Indicators Online 
Public Spending   World Development Indicators Online 
Net skill intensity of 
exports  Calculated from UN Comtrade 
Post-secondary education 
share  Barro and Lee (2000) 
Law and order   PRS: International Country Risk Guide 
Arable land   World Development Indicators Online 
Oil reserves 
  World Resources Institute: http://earthtrends.wri.org/ 
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 Table 6: Economic indicators: selected Asia and Pacific economies 





















FDI as %  
GDP  
China  1980  186  418  2.58  0.11  1  ..  0.03 
  1990  392  1,326  1.02  0.09  2  0.10  0.98 
  1995  658  2,514  0.37  0.09  2.2  0.19  4.92 
  2000  949  3,939  0.40  0.08  2.7  0.29  3.20 
India  1980  223  629  0.54  0.24  2.5  0.04  0.04 
  1990  317  1,351  0.40  0.19  4.1  0.05  0.07 
  1995  372  1,790  0.25  0.17  4.5  0.05  0.60 
  2000  453  2,364  0.31  0.16  4.8  0.06  0.78 
Indonesia  1980  397  777  5.42  0.12  0.8  0.01  0.38 
  1990  612  1,814  1.07  0.11  2.3  0.01  0.96 
  1995  827  2,764  0.40  0.09  3.6  0.07  2.15 
  2000  800  2,904  0.83  0.10  5  0.15  2.72 
Korea  1980  3,221  2,581  n.a.  0.05  8.9  0.14  0.01 
  1990  6,615  8,008  0.00  0.05  13.4  0.27  0.30 
  1995  9,159  12,514  0.00  0.04  21.1  0.35  0.34 
  2000  10,884  16,149  0.00  0.04  25.8  0.39  1.81 
Malaysia  1980  1,848  2,178  2.63  0.07  1.4  0.10  3.75 
  1990  2,547  4,536  1.83  0.10  2.8  0.32  5.30 
  1995  3,510  7,054  0.95  0.09  6.8  0.50  4.70 
  2000  3,927  8,570  1.34  0.08  7.5  0.61  4.19 
Philippines  1980  983  2,149    0.11  15.2  0.02  -0.33 
  1990  914  3,021    0.09  18.7  0.12  1.20 
  1995  909  3,390  0.00  0.08  20.4  0.21  1.99 
  2000  995  4,030  0.00  0.07  22.2  0.74  2.97 
Singapore  1980  9,056  4,993    0.00  3.4  0.19  10.53 
  1990  14,674  12,227  0.00  0.00  4.7  0.44  15.13 
  1995  19,370  18,214  0.00  0.00  7.6  0.60  13.72 
  2000  23,077  23,563  0.00  0.00  10.6  0.64  17.77 
Thailand  1980  804  1,374  0.00  0.36  2.9  0.06  0.59 
  1990  1,452  3,749  0.07  0.32  7.8  0.20  2.86 
  1995  2,057  5,993  0.03  0.29  9.4  0.29  1.23 
  2000  1,998  6,319  0.11  0.26  11.3  0.36  2.74 
Vietnam  1980  ..  ..    0.11      .. 
  1990  227  940    0.08      2.78 
  1995  305  1,428  1.77  0.07      8.59 
  2000  397  2,016  6.11  0.08  2.6  0.07  4.16 
Sources: See Table 5.      29 
 
Table 7: Estimation results 
Variable/Method  RE  RE  RE/AR(1)  RE/AR(1) 
Adjusted FDI stock  0.695***  0.506***  0.546***  0.550*** 
  (0.1356)  (0.1306)  (0.1155)  (0.1131) 
Arable land per capita  -0.035  -0.037  -0.050**  -0.047** 
  (0.0281)  (0.0262)  (0.0192)  (0.0188) 
Oil reserves  -0.009  -0.010*  -0.010*  -0.013** 
  (0.0069)  (0.0063)  (0.0058)  (0.0057) 
Post secondary education share  0.223*  0.146  0.329***  0.245** 
  (0.1256)  (0.1226)  (0.1153)  (0.1145) 
Law & order  -0.000  -0.005  -0.002  -0.007 
  (0.0050)  (0.0046)  (0.0051)  (0.0057) 
Law & order * Oil reserves  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.0017)  (0.0046)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Population      -0.010  -0.025 
      (0.0482)  (0.0479) 
Phone lines per 000 pop.      0.003***  0.003*** 
      (0.0009)  (0.0010) 
GDP per capita    0.002    0.002 
    (0.0018)    (0.0018) 
Developing country = 1  -0.084***  -0.069*  0.018  0.040 
  (0.0285)  (0.0386)  (0.0367)  (0.0380) 
East Asia & Pacific = 1  0.196***  0.218***  0.179***  0.194*** 
  (0.0310)  (0.0297)  (0.0233)  (0.0286) 
1985-90 = 1  -0.057***  -0.005  -0.020  0.013 
  (0.0184)  (0.0213)  (0.0199)  (0.0275) 
1990-95 = 1  -0.013  -0.005  0.010  0.014 
  (0.0108)  (0.0101)  (0.0113)  (0.0122) 
1995-2000 = 1  0.003  0.000  0.021**  0.019** 
  (0.0083)  (0.0076)  (0.0088)  (0.0088) 
 (1985-90)*East Asia & Pacific =1    -0.132***    -0.063 
    (0.0303)    (0.0423) 
 (1990-95)*East Asia & Pacific =1    -0.072***    -0.017 
    (0.0189)    (0.0265) 
 (1995-2000)*East Asia & Pacific =1    0.009    0.043** 
    (0.0172)    (0.0188) 
Observations  160  160  160  160 
Groups  76  76  76  76 
R-square         
within  0.4646  0.6716  0.4528  0.5643 
between  0.6322  0.6315  0.6810  0.6890 
 overall  0.6087  0.6282  0.6338  0.6567 
Note: RE: random effects estimator; AR(1): first-order autoregressive error structure. 
Standard error in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     30 
 
Table 8: Elasticities of the estimates at sample means 
Variable/Method  RE  RE  RE/AR(1)  RE/AR(1) 
Adjusted FDI stock  0.2315***  0.1688***  0.1819***  0.1834*** 
Arable land per capita  -0.1144  -0.1200  -0.1617**  -0.1529** 
Oil reserves  -0.1498  -0.1686*  -0.1709*  -0.2092** 
Post secondary education share  0.2461*  0.1616  0.3634***  0.2712** 
Law & order  -0.0132  -0.2236  -0.1015  -0.3076 
Law & order * Oil reserves  0.0860  0.1024  0.1151  0.1478 
Population      -0.0060  -0.0145 
Telephone lines per 000 pop.      0.4540***  0.4658*** 
GDP per capita    0.1708    0.1725 






Table 9: Actual and predicted skill-intensive export shares, developing SE Asia 
  Period  Actual share  Average prediction* 
Indonesia  1985-1990  -0.007  0.112 
  1990-1995  0.023  0.179 
  1995-2000  0.077  0.244 
  2000-2005  0.132  0.258 
       
Malaysia  1985-1990  0.240  0.219 
  1990-1995  0.349  0.312 
  1995-2000  0.496  0.482 
  2000-2005  0.521  0.573 
       
Thailand  1985-1990  0.131  0.141 
  1990-1995  0.196  0.215 
  1995-2000  0.297  0.311 
  2000-2005  0.307  0.363 
* Average computed from the results of four regression models shown in Table 7. 
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Table 10: Skill-intensive export share predictions for Indonesia using regional FDI and human capital 
data 
Period   Actual  Counterfactual with data from 
  Indonesia  Thailand   Malaysia 
    Total 
1986-90  -0.007  0.004  0.016 
Difference (%)    161.27%  345.80% 
    Due to human capital: 
    0.004  -0.003 
share of total difference (%)    92.42%  -20.41% 
    Due to FDI: 
    -0.006  0.013 
share of total difference (%)    -155.63%  79.73% 
       
    Total 
1990-95  0.023  0.042  0.048 
Difference (%)    81.95%  106.88% 
    Due to human capital: 
    0.036  0.024 
share (%)    68.81%  4.80% 
    Due to FDI: 
    0.029  0.046 
share (%)    31.19%  95.20% 
       
    Total 
1995-2000  0.077  0.094  0.119 
Difference (%)    22.99%  55.31% 
    Due to human capital: 
    0.090  0.084 
share (%)    77.54%  17.78% 
    Due to FDI: 
    0.081  0.112 
share (%)    22.46%  82.22% 
       
       
    Total 
2000-2005  0.132  0.170  0.223 
Difference (%)    28.68%  69.21% 
    Due to human capital: 
    0.147  0.138 
share (%)    39.26%  6.46% 
    Due to FDI: 
    0.155  0.217 
share (%)    60.74%  93.54% 
Source: As for Table 9.     32 
 
 







Figure 2: Net high-tech exports as share of total merchandise exports,  
selected countries (Source: authors’ computations from Comtrade data).      33 
 
 
Figure 3: Manufacturing value-added per worker, selected Asia and Pacific economies (units: thousands 







Figure 4: Indonesia: skill-intensive export share, 1989-2005 (Source of basic data: World Development 
Indicators Online) 